This paper examines competition in the liberalized natural gas market. Each .firm has zero marginal cost core capacity, due to long term contracts with take or pay obligations, and additional capacity at higher marginal costs. The market is decentralized and the firms decide which customers to serve, competing then in prices. In equilibrium each .firm approaches a different segment of the market and sets the monopoly price, i.e. market segmentation. Antitrust ceilings do not prevent such an outcome while the separation of wholesale and retail activities and the creation of a wholesale market induces generalized competition and low margins in the retail segment. Abstract This paper examines competition in the liberalized natural gas market. Each …rm has zero marginal cost core capacity, due to long term contracts with take or pay obligations, and additional capacity at higher marginal costs. The market is decentralized and the …rms decide which customers to serve, competing then in prices. In equilibrium each …rm approaches a di¤erent segment of the market and sets the monopoly price, i.e. market segmentation. Antitrust ceilings do not prevent such an outcome while the separation of wholesale and retail activities and the creation of a wholesale market induces generalized competition and low margins in the retail segment.
Introduction
In this paper we analyze if competition may emerge in the natural gas markets as shaped by the liberalization process implemented in Europe since the second part of the Nineties. In this period the European Commission has promoted through several Directives the liberalization of the main public utility markets, such as telecommunications, electricity and natural gas; the framework adopted is by and large common to these industries, and rests on the open access to the network infrastructures, the unbundling of monopolistic from competitive activities and the opening of demand.
The natural gas Directive 98/30 has speci…ed the lines of reform that the Member Countries then followed in the national liberalization plans. Contrary to the case of electricity markets, no wholesale pool market is recommended 1 for the natural gas. The general principle of Third Party Access (TPA) has been con…rmed, with one relevant exception, namely when giving access to the network would create technical or …nancial problems to the incumbent because of its take-or-pay (TOP) obligations.
A take-or-pay obligation entails an unconditional …xed payment, which enables the purchaser to get up to a certain threshold quantity of gas. This payment is due whether or not the company actually decides to get (and resell) it, and further payments are due if the company wants to receive additional quantities. The very nature of this kind of contracts, therefore, is to substite variable payments conditional on actual deliveries with a …xed unconditional payment up to a certain threshold level of delivery. 1 We argue that the existence of take-or-pay obligations not only creates problems in the application of the TPA, but introduces a natural strategic incentive for …rms to avoid competition for …nal customers. Therefore, entry may entail no actual competition (and no bene…t for the consumers) as the …rms will choose to concentrate on di¤erent customers, thus segmenting demand.
We derive this result on the basis of three main assumptions which refer to key features of the European gas industry and by the main lines of reform of the European Directives. First, wholesalers purchase gas under long term import contracts, the bulk of gas supply in most European countries, that impose takeor-pay obligations to the buyer. Consequently, each wholesaler has negligible marginal costs up to its obligations, although it has additional capacity at higher marginal cost, coming for instance from extentions of the long term contracts. Second, there is no separation of wholesale and retail activities nor a wholesale market, and the retail market is decentralized: the wholesalers can directly operate in the retail market, selecting which customers to approach. Third, once chosen their potential customers …rms compete in prices, with some horizontal di¤erentiation in their service. Horizontal di¤erentiation is an easy way to justify the idea that retail markets can be opened to competition and they are not natural monopolies, even if …rms compete in prices and supply a homogenous product as the natural gas. A limited product di¤erentiation, indeed, allows some small but positive margins to cover possible entry costs and sustain a fragmented market.
In this setting we study the (marketing and price) equilibria when a new comer enters in the market competing with the incumbent. In a decentralized market each …rm decides which customers to serve. When two …rms with TOP obligations target the same customers, the two …rms have the same (zero) marginal costs, and equilibrium margins are low due to price competition. When instead only one of the two …rms has TOP obligations, the high marginal cost competitor is unable to obtain positive pro…ts in a price equilibrium. This feature of price competition with TOP obligations drives the commercial strategies of the …rms: entering the same market is never convenient because it gives low pro…ts and leaves residual obligations to the two …rms (fostering competing en-tries in other submarkets). Leaving a fraction of the customers to the rival, instead, allows it to exhaust its TOP obligations and makes it a high cost (potential) rival with no incentive to compete on the residual demand. In a word, leaving the rival to act as a monopolist on a fraction of the market guarantees a …rm to be a monopolist on the residual demand. It should be stressed that the high …xed TOP payments play no role in our result, that would still hold even with negligible or no …xed costs. The segmentation result, instead, is driven entirely by the existence of low cost capacity due to TOP obligations.
Our results may have some interest in the policy debate on gas liberalization. The discussion so far has focussed on the development and access to international and national transport infrastructures and on the unbundling of activities of incumbent …rms. 2 The recent Energy sector inquiry of the European Commission (2006) stresses that problems of access are still the main concern of policy makers. Although we share this claim, we argue that even if the access problems were solved there would still be a serious issue of (wholesale and retail) market design that so far has received little attention. We show that even gas release programmes aimed at reducing the incumbent's market shares can be unable to provide actual bene…ts to the customers.
A more competitive outcome might instead be obtained if wholesale and retail activities are separated and a centralized wholesale market is created, where the wholesalers (burdened by TOP obligations) sell and the retailers buy gas. In this case, the retailers when designing their marketing strategies, have the same ‡at marginal cost equal to the wholesale price for any amount of gas they want to supply, and therefore they will obtain, contrary to the benchmark case, small but positive margins in any market they enter. Generalized entry becomes the dominant stategy, bringing in intense price competition and low margins in the retail market.
The existing literature on take or pay contracts (see Creti and Villeneuve, 2004 , for a broad survey) focusses almost entirely on the reasons which justify their existence. For instance, Crocker and Masten (1985) argue that a simple contract of this kind provides appropriate incentives to limit opportunistic behaviour, while Hubbard and Weiner (1986) emphasize the risk sharing properties of such a contract. However, the consequences of these contracts on competition remain out of the scope of these analyses.
A second stream of literature which is relevant to our analysis is the one on market competition with capacity constraints or decreasing returns. Although our motivation is primarely on liberalization of the gas industry, our segmentation result may be of independent interest in the analysis of price equilibria with capacity constraints. While price competition with constant marginal costs leads to the Bertrand outcome, since the seminal work by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) we know that capacity constraints may modify the incentives to cutthroat price competition. When a …rm faces constant marginal costs up to a certaint absolute capacity constraint, the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is equivalent to the corresponding Cournot equilibrium if …rms follow an e¢ cient rationinig rule, while it is intermediate between Cournot and Bertrand if proportinal rationing is applied (Davidson and Deneckere (1986) . Vives (1986) shows that if marginal costs are ‡at up to capacity and then they are increasing, their steepness determines how the equilibrium ranges from Bertrand to Cournot. The literature on supply function equilibria (Klemperer and Meyer (1989) ) has generalized this intuition showing that if …rms can choose and commit to any supply function, all the individually rational outcomes can be implemented in equilibrium. Our paper adopts the same technology as Maggi (1996) 3 , that introduces discontinuous marginal costs as those that emerge with TOP obligations. Maggi shows that the amplitude of the stepwise increase in the marginal cost determines equilibrium outcomes that range from Bertrand (no jump) to Cournot.
Our paper shares many features of the analysis of Bertrand-Edgeworth competition with dynamic pricing 4 : Dubey (1992) shows that absolute capacity constraints and dynamic pricing over a sequence of consumers avoids price cycles (or mixed strategy equilibvria) and leads to almost monopoly prices. We show in out paper that similar results can be obtained with no absolute capacity constraint and with simultanous pricing, provided that entry and pricing in the submarkets are taken sequentially.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the main assumptions of the model; section 3 analyzes the sequential entry case; section 4 considers the endogenous choice of TOP obligations by the entrant. Antitrust ceilings and centralized vs. decentralized markets are discussed in section 5 and 6. Concluding remarks follow, while an Appendix contains the proofs of the results.
The model
Two …rms, the incumbent (I) and the entrant (E), are active in the retail market for natural gas provision. The …rms purchase the natural gas from the extractors and resell it to the …nal customers transporting it through the pipeline network. Although third party access is far from established in the natural gas industry in many European countries, in this paper we want to study the features of entry and competition in the retail market, absent any entry barriers to the transport infrastructures that might distort the competitive process. Consequently, we assume that Third Party Access is fully implemented, implying that no bottleneck or abusive conduct prevents the access of the entrant to the transportation network at non discriminatory terms.
Our model of the retail market is based on three main features.
1. The wholesale activity (buying gas from extractors) and the retail activity (selling gas to the …nal customers) are not separated and are managed by the same …rms (retailers). The main source of supply for the retailers are long term contracts with the extractors with take-or-pay obligations on a certain amount of gas; hence, the retailers have zero marginal cost up to the output that ful…lls these obligations. They can obtain additional gas from other sources, as spot contracts or extensions of the main contract, at a (higher) marginal cost that re ‡ects the marginal purchase price.
2. The liberalized retail gas market is decentralized (single transactions may take place with di¤erent customers at di¤erent times and at di¤erent prices) and each …rm has to decide which customers/submarkets it wants to approach, an irreversible decision in the short run. Submarkets can be identi…ed by location (geographical submarkets) or by the type of customers (residential, business, speci…c industries, etc.) that require dedicated (sunk) sales resources.
3. Once chosen which customers to approach (their marketing strategy) the …rms compete in prices, possibly with a slight di¤erentiation in the commercial service provided.
We now move on describing in details the costs, demand and timing of the game.
Costs
The retailers's costs refer to the purchase, transport and sales of gas. Since we assume that transport services are o¤ered at non discriminatory terms, the network access costs are the same for E and I and, w.l.o.g., equal to zero. Variable sales costs are assumed to be zero as well. Purchase costs depend on the nature of the upstream contractual arrangements. The bulk of retailer's costs refer therefore to the purchase of gas from the extractors. Each retailer i = I; E has a portfolio of long term contracts with the extractors, where the unit cost of gas w i and a TOP obligation q i per unit of time are speci…ed, such that the retailer has to pay to the extractor an amount w i q i no matter if the gas is taken or not. Retailers can obtain additional supply from secondary sources, as extensions of the main contract or spot contracts with other providers. In our setting what distinguishes the primary from the secondary source is the nature of the marginal purchase price: it is zero up to the TOP obligations q i while it is positive and (w.l.o.g.) equal to w i for additional supply 5 . Notice that in our model the …rms have no capacity constraints but a discontinuous marginal cost 5 Long term contracts usually include additional clauses, as a total annual capacity that can be 25-30% larger than TOP obligations, and rules to anticipate or postpone the full…lment of TOP obligations across years. All these elements do not modify the key element in our analysis, a discontinuous marginal purchase price once TOP obligations are exhausted. Hence, we model the costs according to this essential feature.
curve, that jumps from 0 to w i once the TOP obligations are exhausted. For simplicity, we assume w E = w I = w. The cost function of …rm i is therefore:
Demand Individual consumers d = 1; ::; D have completely inelastic unit demand; total demand is therefore D. They view the gas supplied in the market as perfectly homogeneous; however, consumers attach to each …rm other (commercial or locational) characteristics that make the services slightly di¤erentiated. We adopt a Hotelling-type speci…cation. The customers are uniformly distributed with respect to their preferred variety of the service according to a parameter v 2 [0; 1]. The utility of a consumer with preferred variety v purchasing one unit of gas at price p i from …rm i o¤ering a service with characteristic
where 0 is a parameter describing the importance of the commercial services (product di¤erentiation) for the client. Our model, therefore, includes perfect substitutability ( = 0) as a special case.
There are three key parameters in the model, u , w and , whose values in ‡uence the equilibrium outcomes. Qualitatively, we claim that gas is an important input in many activities (u is high), it is costly (w is large as well) and it is a commodity, with limited oportunities to di¤erentiate the o¤ers ( is very low). We translate these qualitative claims into the following assumptions:
Assumption (2) is su¢ cient to ensure that a monopolist prefers to cover the entire market at the highest possible price rather than further rise it and ration the market and that its equilibrium pro…ts are non negative. 6 Assumption (3) ensures that internal solutions give non negative prices in any subgame where the two …rms compete. See Proposition 1's proof for details.
Each …rm i = I; E is characterized by a speci…c variety x i of the service, due to its location and/or commercial practices. We assume that x I = 1=4 and x E = 3=4, i.e. the two …rms have some (exogenous) di¤erence in the service provided 7 . The …rms do not observe the individual customer's tastes (her preferred service variety v) but know only the (uniform) distribution of
when only the incumbent entered in market t and the market is not completely covered, due to the very high price set, the demand is
TOP obligations and capacities
The portfolios of long term contracts of the two …rms re ‡ect their di¤erent positions: before the liberalization, the incumbent was the only supplier of the market, while the entrant is trying to capture some market share. The obligations of the incumbent, given its previous position, are very large but do not exceed market demand, i.e q I D. In the equilibrium analysis we'll concentrate on the case q I < D in which the incumbent's obligations do not cover the entire demand; 8 once understood the equilibrium in this case, the extension to the case q I = D will be straightforward. Regarding the entrant's long term contracts, we initially assume that its obligations are equal to the residual demand, i.e
Once the benchmark model is analyzed, we'll endogenize the entrant's choice of obligations q E , showing that indeed the entrant selects obligations equal to the residual market D q I . To sum up, the long term contracts of the two …rms enable them to supply the market at zero marginal cost, since total obligations are equal to total demand. Moreover, the market is very liquid, as each …rm can obtain additional capacity (at the same unit cost w) from the extractors.
Competition and timing
The market is decentralized, so that …rms have to decide which clients to deal with, and propose a price to their potential customers. A given customer may thus face no o¤er, one o¤er (by a …rm that would then be a monopolist for that customer), or two o¤ers from the two competing …rms. Price competition arises in a particular submarket if both …rms approach the same group of customers. Once received the o¤er(s) -if any -the customer decides whether to sign a contract or not. Once a contract is signed, the selected provider supplies all the gas demanded by the customer, since the technology does not imply absolute capacity constraints but simply a discontinuous marginal cost. We assume that the decision to serve a submarket is irreversible in the short run, as it requires to sink some resources (e.g. local distribution networks, local o¢ ces and dedicated personnel). Moreover, the incumbent is always able to move …rst in approaching the customers, due to his pre-existing relationships with the clients, followed by the entrant.
Customers are visited by the …rms sequentially, 9 and, for each customer, once the marketing choices are taken, the active …rms simultaneously propose their prices. When we analyze price competition for the single customer, the crucial element is the amount of residual TOP obligations of the …rms, that enable them to serve the customer at zero marginal cost. Then, from the point of view of equilibrium analysis, since the incumbent moves …rst, all the contracting stages where the incumbent has residual TOP obligations greater (or equal) than the submarket demand are similar: if I decides to enter, E anticipates that by entering in its turn, total TOP obligations will exceed submarket demand. Hence, analyzing all these contracting stages sequentially, with I and then E deciding to enter or not, is equivalent to grouping them together, assuming that there are only two relevant submarkets, the …rst one as large as the incumbent's obligations, D 1 = q I , and the second one covering the residual demand, D 2 = D D 1 = q E . As this compact formulation lends itself to a shorter (but equivalent) equilibrium analysis, we'll adopt it: we assume that the two …rms decide sequentially at …rst whether or not to enter market 1 and then market 2, as de…ned above. We thus de…ne a variable e i t = f0; 1g, i = I; E, t = 1; 2, which refers to …rm i's decision to enter (e = 1) or not (e = 0) in a particular submarket t.
From our discussion, the timing when q I < D is as follows:
at t = 1 the incumbent decides whether to enter (e Before moving to the equilibrium analysis, it appears convenient to anticipate the main result, and then to show (backwards) how this can be proven. The equilibrium of the game can be described as follows:
Result. In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, the incumbent enters in the …rst market, while the entrant enters in the second market. Both …rms charge to their customer(s) the monopoly price.
In order to understand how this result can be obtained, let us start from the last stage of the game
The sequential entry game
In this section we analyze the subgame perfect equilibria in the sequential entry game, where competition in the second market takes place once the outcome in the …rst one is determined. Although the two markets are separate, a strategic link between them remains, because the residual TOP obligations in the second market depend on the outcome of the game in the …rst stage. As we solve the model backwards, we must …rst consider the price equilibria and entry decisions in the second market as a function of the number of …rms applying for the second group of customers and of their residual TOP obligations. .
Proof. See Appendix.
We proceed now by identifying the best reply function when both …rms enter in the second market and compete in prices. First of all, notice that the pro…t functions are continuous and concave, but kinked at q i 2 , due to the jump in the marginal costs from 0 to w once the TOP obligations are exhausted. We start by deriving …rm i's best reply to
; c) be the price that maximizes pro…ts for given p j 2 when the marginal cost is c = f0; wg:
2 ) as the solution to:
i.e. the price p i 2 that, for given p j 2 , makes …rm i's demand equal to its residual obligations. Solving explicitly we obtain:
The following Lemma characterizes the best reply for …rm i.
Proof. See Appendix. Having identi…ed the relevant subgames, corresponding to combinations of the residual obligations described in Lemma 1, and the best reply function when both …rms enter in the second market (Lemma 2), we can now proceed analyzing the price equilibria that occur in the di¤erent subgames according to the entry decisions of the two …rms in the second market. 
e. i is the smaller and j the larger …rm. Each …rm sells all its residual TOP obligation.
2) If both …rms enter the second market and if q
2 , i; j = I; E; i 6 = j (case 2), the equilibrium prices are
Only the smaller …rm i sells all its residual TOP obligation.
3) If both …rms enter the second market and if q and serves the entire market D 2 for any residual obligation it has.
Case (1) refers to a situation where capacity equals demand, and equilibrium prices cannot be larger than w + =2. If residual TOP capacity is larger than demand, we have two additional cases, labelled (2) and (3). In both of them, competition leads to prices lower than in case (1), but above the zero marginal cost due to product di¤erentiation (the demand parameter ). Prices would fall to w in case (1) and to 0 in case (2) and (3), in line with the Bertrand result, when we converge to the homogeneous products case ( ! 0). Our equilibrium prices imply an allocation of demand between i and j in all cases (including the limiting case of homogeneous products) such that in case (1) both …rms sell their residual obligations, in case (2) only the small …rm sells its residual obligations and in case (3) the two …rms equally share the market. Case (4) of Proposition 1 identi…es monopoly prices for any level of the residual obligations. Figure 2 shows the three cases 1), 2) and 3) in which both …rms are active in market 2 and the di¤erent points of intersection of the two best reply functions.
Figure 2 about here
We can now move to the entry decisions of the two …rms in the subgames of the second market, having characterized the equilibrium prices in any subgame. In the entry decision we assume that if a …rm by entering expects zero pro…ts (zero sales in our setting), that …rm will remain out (no frivolous entry) 10 .
The following Proposition identi…es the entry equilibrium in all possible cases.
Proposition 2: In the second market, a …rm enters if and only if its residual TOP obligations are positive.
The intuition behind the equilibrium entry pattern is straightforward. At the second stage, the price equilibria give positive sales and pro…ts as long as a …rm has positive residual obligations; if a …rm with residual obligations competes with one that already exhausted them (but still decides to enter), at the equilibrium prices the latter sells nothing. Hence, there is an incentive to enter only if a …rm has still obligations to be covered. Notice that this entry pattern is entirely driven by the properties of price equilibria and the associated sales for given residual obligations.
Equilibrium
Once obtained the entry and price equilibria in the second market in the four subgames, we can turn our attention to the analysis of the entry and price subgames in the …rst market, when the two …rms have still all their obligations q I and q E . The …rms choose their entry and pricing strategies in the …rst market taking into account the impact through the residual obligations on the equilibrium in the subgames of the second market.
We start our analysis of the …rst market by considering the price games. In general, pricing in the …rst market determines the amount of residual obligations retained by the …rms, and therefore the equilibrium pro…ts that can be obtained in the second market. This link makes the analysis of pricing decisions more complex than in the second stage.
If only one …rm enters in the …rst market, we have to check whether the optimal price entails covering the entire market (as shown for the second stage in Proposition 1) or it prescribes to ration the …rst market (through a price higher than p m ) retaining some residual obligations for the second market that will induce further entry in the second market.
When both …rms enter, if a …rm sets its price in the …rst market in such a way to make the rival selling all its obligations, it gains monopoly pro…ts in the second market. But since this incentive applies to both …rms if they enter the …rst market, this strategy is mutually inconsistent, leading to non existence of price equilibria in pure strategies. The following proposition analyses the di¤erent cases. and supplies the entire market D 1 . b) If both …rms enter in the …rst market:
1. there is no price equilibrium in pure strategies, 2. an equilibrium in mixed strategies
3. in the mixed strategy equilibrium both …rms obtain positive expected profits and the expected total pro…ts of the entrant in the two markets are E E (
Some comments are in order. Part (a) of Proposition 3 shows that the strategic link between the two markets is insu¢ cient to distort the …rst market pricing decisions when only one …rm enters. In this case the active …rm faces two alternatives: extract the monopoly rents from the consumers in the …rst market, or retain some residual obligations for the second market by overpricing above the monopoly price, leaving some market 1 customers unserved. In this latter case, however, the …rm cannot extend its monopoly to the second market (where the rival will enter being still endowed with positive TOP obligations) and it will obtain competitive, rather than monopoly, returns on its residual obligations. Hence, shifting some obligations to the second (competitive) market is not convenient, and the …rm sets the monopoly price and covers the entire market D 1 without entering market.2.
As for the price game when both …rms enter in the …rst market, when we evaluate total equilibrium pro…ts as a function of p i 1 (given p j 1 ) we …nd the following. When …rm i's o¤er is much cheaper than …rm j's, the former sells all its obligations in the …rst market and does not enter the second one, as shown in Proposition 2. When the prices of the two …rms are closer both use only part of their TOP obligations in market 1, and therefore both …rms enter the second market. Finally, when …rm i's o¤er is much more expensive than …rm j's, this latter exhausts its obligations in market 1, and only …rm i enters as a monopolist in market 2. Inducing the rival to sell all its obligations in the …rst market becomes the dominant strategy for both …rms, since it secures monopoly rents in the second market; and this is why we do not have a price equilibrium in pure strategies in the …rst market.
The crucial feature of the mixed strategy equilibrium (that arises when both …rms enter in market 1, so that both …rms enter market 2 as well) is that the total expected pro…ts E can earn in both markets are below the monopoly pro…ts that it can earn with certainty in market 2 by staying out of market 1.
We have completed our analysis of the price games in the …rst market, obtaining all the ingredients to address the entry decisions in the …rst stage. The following Proposition -in line with the claim expressed at the beginning of the section -establishes our main segmentation result. Proof. See Appendix.
Once analyzed the case where the incumbent's obligations do not cover the entire demand, we can easily consider the complementary case in which q I = D. The following Corollary establishes the result. When the incumbent is endowed with obligations equal to total demand while the potential entrant has none, the results established in Proposition 1, case 1 can be used to describe the equilibrium prices if the entrant enters in the market after the incumbent. Since the entrant's equilibrium sales are zero, E will prefer to stay out of the market, that is completely monopolized by the incumbent.
Comments to the result
The result obtained shows that when entry is allowed, the incumbent serves a fraction of the market equal to its TOP obligations and leaves the rest (if any) to the entrant. Liberalization, in this setting, allows the entry of new …rms but does not bring in competition, inducing segmentation and monopoly pricing.
When a …rm has TOP clauses, in fact, its cost structure is characterized by zero marginal costs up to the obligations and higher marginal cost for larger quantities. If both …rms enter in the …rst market, we have two consequences: the low marginal cost capacity is used in a competitive price game obtaining low returns; moreover, both …rms remain with positive residual obligations, that induce them to enter in the second market as well, again with competitive low returns. On the other hand, leaving a fraction of the market to the rival comes out to be a mutually convenient strategy. The other …rm, in fact, once exhausted its TOP obligations serving the customers in a monopoly position, becomes a high (marginal) cost competitor with no incentives to enter the residual fraction of the market, since even entering it will not obtain any sales in the price equilibrium. By leaving the rival in a monopoly position on a part of the market a …rm acquires a monopoly position on the residual customers. 11 The key ingredients of this result are decentralized trades and a core low cost capacity, due to TOP obligations, two central features of the natural gas industry. Decentralized trades implies that the …rms have to decide which customers they want to serve by committing to a certain marketing strategy, that in our model corresponds to the initial decision to enter or not a given submarket. The gas provision contracts signed with the producers create the incentives to selective entry in the retail market. First, long term contracts are a natural commitment device, since they cannot be renegotiated or modi…ed at will. Secondly, although the market is apparently very liquid, since overall capacity is unbounded, what matters to determine the basic market interaction is the amount of low marginal cost capacity, i.e of TOP obligations.
Finally, it should be stressed that our segmentation result is not just an example of the well known result that with high …xed costs (the …xed payments entailed by TOP obligations) a market with intense price competition becomes a monopoly in a free entry equilibrium. Suppose, in fact, that the …rms have large …xed costs and constant marginal cost, with positive but limited margins over marginal costs in a price equilibrium. In a free entry equilibrium where the incumbent and the entrat decide sequentially to enter or not, we would observe the incumbent monopolizing the entire market: it would enter in each submarket and induce the entrant to stay out to avoid losses over the …xed costs. This traditional story would not deliver the alternating monoply result that we obtain, such that an incumbent with a …rst mover advantage in entering any submarket will leave a fraction of the market to the entrant, once exhausted its obligations. What drives our result, indeed, is the low cost capacity of the competitors, that eliminates the incentive to enter once exhausted and that creates reciprocity in the entry/no entry strategy.
Endogenizing the entrant' s obligations
So far we have assumed that the entrant, facing an incumbent endowed with TOP obligations equal to q I , has a long term contract with obligations equal to D q I , so that total obligations equal total demand. Here we want to show that if the entrant chooses q E in order to maximize pro…ts, it will actually choose exactly q E = D q I . In this section therefore we add an initial stage where the entrant signs its long term contract deciding the amount of TOP obligations.
We already know that if the entrant chooses TOP obligations equal to the residual demand, q E = D q I , in equilibrium its pro…ts can be written as the consumers at monopoly prices. We obtain similar results without absolute capacity constraints and without dynamic pricing. In our setting, in fact, the key ingredient is the di¤erent timing in entry and pricing decisions. In the wp version of the paper we prove that segmentation occurs even when both …rms decide simultaneously to enter in the di¤erent submarkets and then, having observed the entry choices, set simultaneously a price in each of the submarket where they entered. Sequential entry in our case simply allows to eliminate the coordination problem that simultaneous entry otherwise would imply in the choice of submarkets. w)(D q
in the …rst submarket of size q I , only the incumbent enters and sets the monopoly price; in the second submarket, of size q E , the roles are reversed and the entrant is monopolist in this segment;
for the residual customers, D q I q E , both …rms would have marginal cost equal to w having exhausted their obligations. If they both enter, the equilibrium is symmetric with a price equal to w + 2 , and the two …rms serve half of the residual demand gaining positive pro…ts 4 (D q I q E ). Hence, both …rms enter. 
w)(D q I ). Hence, the entrant 13 does not gain from having obligations lower than D q I . Second, consider the case q E > D q I , where total obligations are larger than total demand. The arguments are quite similar to the benchmark case. We can analyze the equilibrium distinguishing the two submarkets q I = D 1 and D q I = D 2 as before. From the previous analysis, going through the same steps, it is easy to see that the equilibrium entry and price decisions are the same as in Proposition 4, with I entering the …rst market, and E the second one, with sales D 2 < q E . Although E has TOP obligations exceeding residual demand D q I , it prefers not to enter as long as the incumbent has exhausted its own obligations. In fact, if E decides to enter the …rst market, it would share D 1 with the incumbent and, as a consequence, I would not exhaust its obligations q I in the …rst market. Hence, the incumbent would enter the second market as well, destroying the monopoly pro…ts that E would gain otherwise. Hence, the entrant would prefer 1 2 To save space we leave a formal proof, which is basically the same as the benchmark model, to the reader. 1 3 Alternatively, in the spirit of our entry model, we can notice that if D > q I + q E there is room for a third …rm with obligations D q I q E to enter and monopolize the residual demand. The …rst entrant then would obtain pro…ts (u 9 16 w)q E < (u to maintain its residual obligations idle (and therefore does not choose excessive obligations). Therefore, the entrant will choose to sign obligations equal to the residual demand D q I , as assumed in the benchmark model. We summarize this discussion in the following Proposition.
Proposition 5: If the entrant chooses its obligations q
E at time 0, given the incumbent's obligations q I , and then the game follows as in the benchmark model, the entrant chooses obligations equal to the residual demand, i.e. q E = D q I .
The allocation of demand between the incumbent and the entrant in our model depends on the amount of TOP obligations held by I when liberalization starts. The market share of the incumbent after entry therefore can be very large if q I = D, with a very limited scope for newcomers. In the limit, if I has TOP obligations equal to market demand, there is no room for entry in the market as claimed above.
To avoid such an outcome, the liberalization plans in some European countries, as Italy, Spain and UK, have introduced constraints on the incumbent market share, as antitrust ceilings or release of import contracts. In the following section we consider whether this instrument can help to promote competition in the retail market.
Antitrust ceilings and the persistence of segmentation
In this section we enrich the benchmark model, introducing a further restriction in line with the gas release decisions of a few countries following liberalization: we assume that the incumbent cannot supply more than a certain amount of gas, b q I < q I . In this regime, I can sell (or it is forced to sell, in some cases) its TOP obligations exceeding b q I to other operators, i.e. it can resell its long run contracts exceeding the ceiling. Consequently, given q E , the TOP obligations of the entrant in the benchmark model, its overall obligations when antitrust ceilings are introduced become b
The main di¤erence relative to the previous case is that market share ceilings imply an absolute capacity constraint b q I for the incumbent while TOP obligations introduce only a jump up in marginal costs but do not prevent the incumbent from producing more than q I . We can analyze the sequential entry game assuming that the two markets are and the …rm covers D 2 unless it is the incumbent and has residual obligations b q I 2 < D 2 . However, the introduction of (absolute) capacity constraints instead of (milder) TOP obligations changes the nature of equilibrium price when both …rms enter in the second market. In this case no price equilibrium in pure strategies exists. However, a mixed strategy equilibrium with positive pro…ts exists, as the following Lemma establishes. b q I . Then, as in the benchmark model, each …rm has the incentive to price su¢ ciently high in order to induce the rival to exhaust its take-or-pay obligations. (and ceiling) and stay out of the second market, where the former …rm will gain monopoly power. These strategies are mutually incompatible, which leads to mixed strategies equilibria. Consequently, it is easy to check that the same price equilibria and entry decision already analyzed in the benchmark model still apply, even taking into account the di¤erent second market price equilibrium analyzed in Lemma 3. The following Proposition summarizes the results. The only e¤ect of antitrust ceilings is therefore to create scope for entry and to shift market shares and pro…ts from the incumbent to newcomers. Notice that forcing the incumbent to sell import contracts or setting a corresponding ceiling to its …nal sales would yield the same result. Customers do not bene…t from gas release programs of this type, as the segmentation result and monopoly pricing still hold.
The introduction of a wholesale market
Antitrust ceilings are not able to prevent the segmentation of the market: even in this setting, the incentive to spend in di¤erent markets the low marginal cost capacity due to TOP obligations drives the marketing phase of the game, where the …rms decide which customers to approach. In this section we want to explore the consequences of separating the wholesale and retail activities, creating a wholesale gas market, where the wholesalers bearing TOP obligations sell and the retailers buy their gas at a (linear) wholesale price.
We argue that breaking the link between the decentralised retail market, where entry decisions in the customers'submarkets are taken, and the upstream wholesale segment, where TOP are imposed by producers, may o¤er a solution. To this end, two reforms of the market are needed. First of all, operators in the upstream market (wholesalers), that contract and purchase gas from the extractors, cannot participate also in the dowstream market (retailers), where …rms provide gas to the …nal consumers. Secondly, a compulsory wholesale market is created where wholesalers sell and retailers buy gas at a common wholesale price. We try to model this alternative environment keeping the structure of the model as close as possible to the benchmark case.
The wholesale market. On the supply side of the wholesale market, we have two large operators (our …rms I and E). They obtain gas from the producers on the basis of long term contracts with TOP clauses as described in the benchmark model, up to output levels q I and q E with q I + q E = D. On the demand side we have the retail …rms, which buy gas from the wholesale market and resell it to …nal consumers. Since gas is a commodity, wholesale transaction entail perfectly homogenous product by the two wholesalers. The equilibrium wholesale price p w clears the market.
The retail market. The retailers buy at the wholesale price and therefore are free from TOP obligations, and each of them has the same constant marginal cost, equal to the wholesale gas price p w , for any amount of gas demanded. As in the benchmark model, …nal demand can be decomposed into D (groups of) customers of size equal to 1, and the retailers have to decide which customers to serve. Each group of customers considers the retailers'supplies as di¤erentiated according to service or location elements. In order to keep the structure of the model as similar as possible to the benchmark case, we maintain the assumption that the retail market is also a duopoly 14 , with …rm a o¤ering variety x a = 1 4 and …rm b o¤ering variety x b = 3 4 in each submarket. To sum up, the …nal demand is the same as in the benchmark model, and the same is true for the wholesale supply of gas and the costs of TOP contracts. However, once a wholesale market is introduced, we obtain a separation between the wholesalers I and E bearing TOP obligations and the retailers a an b, that select the submarkets to serve with a constant marginal cost p w .
Since the retailers in this setting have always the same marginal cost p w , when analysing their entry and price decisions there is no need to group the consumers in two subsets D 1 and D 2 (equal to q I and q E respectively) as we did in the benchmark model, since in the present setting the entry decisions in the di¤erent submarkets d = 1; :::; D are all identical. When analyzing the retail market we maintain the key assumption of the benchmark model, that is the …rms decide entry and price at di¤erent stages.
In the benchmark model we also assumed sequential entry in each submarket, with the incumbent moving …rst: as we claimed in the discussion, this assumption is not crucial for the results, since an equilibrium with segmentation arises even when entry is simultaneous. However, in the asymmetric equilibrium characterized by segmentation the …rms had to solve a coordination problem in selecting the "right" submarkets to serve as monopolists. This problem was easily addressed by assuming sequential entry and …rst mover advantage by the incumbent. Even in the present setting the entry pattern is the same with sequential and simultanous entry; moreover, we'll show that generalized entry occurs in equilibrium, implying that we have no coordination problem to solve. Therefore we can assume simultanous entry in each submarket in the …rst stage, followed by the simultanous price stage.
Entering and setting prices allows the two retailers to collect the orders. The expected demand for …rm j = a; b from customer d , D (4) and (5)). In particular, if both …rms a and b enter in submarket d (of size 1) the demand for …rm j = a; b is: 
is total demand from the retailers in the wholesale market. The two wholesalers I and E compete in prices given total demand.
The timing of the game is therefore:
at t = 1 the retailers j = a; b decide simultanously whether to enter submarkets d = 1; ::; D (with total demand D); the entry choices become public information once taken; at t = 2 the retailers set simultaneously the price vectors p a and p b and collect the orders in the submarket where they entered; at t = 3 the wholesalers I and E compete in prices in the (wholesale) market, given the demand from the retailers D(p a ; p b ). The retailers purchase at the equilibrium wholesale price p w and serve the …nal customers at the contracted prices p a and p b .
Let us consider the equilibrium of the game, starting from the third stage, where the two wholesalers I and E compete in prices, each endowed with TOP obligations q I and q E , q I + q E = D. Since the wholesale market is a commodity market, Bertrand competition describes the basic interaction between the two …rms: they simultaneously post their prices, the demand is allocated and each …rm supplies its notional demand. In case of equal prices, the allocation of demand is indeterminate and we'll assume that the two …rms decide how to share total demand among them. The following Proposition establishes the wholesale price equilibrium.
The wholesale equilibrium prices described in the Proposition above are equal to the unit cost of gas w if D(p a ; p b ) = D (= q I + q E ), i.e if the retailers serve all the consumers, while p w < w if the retail market is rationed, i.e.
Moreover, under the reasonable assumption that when …rms set the same price the individual demand is noncreasing in total demand, the wholesale price is increasing in total sales. Hence, although the wholesalers have a stepwise marginal cost curve, the equilibrium wholesale price is an increasing function of total wholesale supply of gas. We can now conclude our analysis considering the equilibrium in the retail market. A wholesale market, determining a ‡at marginal cost curve at p w , eliminates the strategic links among the entering decisions in the di¤erent submarkets: the marginal cost is always the same, and it does not depend on the entry and price strategies in the other submarkets. Then, the entry decisions are determined by the (positive) contribution to total pro…ts of the additional segment that is served.
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A wholesale market succeeds to avoid the segmentation of the retail market and to obtain generalized competition and lower retail margins (prices). The wholesale …rms, on the other hand, are able to cover their TOP obligations with no losses. In this setting, the competitive bias deriving from long term supply contracts and take-or-pay clauses is avoided, because when the retailers purchase the gas in a liquid wholesale market they have ‡at and symmetric marginal costs independently of individual output levels. The basic mechanism of the benchmark model, such that by leaving a submarket to the rival a …rm would secure to be monopolist on the residual demand, does not work anymore: by entering the additional submarkets a …rm would have the same costs as the rivals and would gain margins over the wholesale price. Hence, generalized entry and competition replace selective entry and monopoly pricing. Notice that sequential entry would determine the same result, since there is no strategic link among submarkets and it is a dominant strategy to enter in each submarket.
It should be stressed that competition in the upstream segment, where the wholesale suppliers sell to the market, may not necessarily lead to a wholesale price equal to the unit cost of gas w, according to the Bertrand equilibrium. The literature on supply function equilibria 16 has shown that the Bertrand equilibrium corresponds to the …rms using a supply curve equal to their true marginal costs; but if …rms are able to commit to a supply curve that includes a mark-up over marginal costs, the equilibrium wholesale prices may be much higher that the competitive ones. In our case, while the downstream margins 2 are low, due to competition and the limited scope for product di¤erentiation, the wholesale price might be much higher than w if the wholesalers use more complex strategies, increasing accordingly the price for the …nal customers. The separation of wholesalers and retailers and the creation of a wholesale market, therefore, ensure to squeeze retail margins, but has no e¤ect on the kind of competition in the wholesale market. Even in this case, however, the outcome in the present setting cannot be worse for customers than that of the benchmark model: if the wholesalers collude they will …nd it pro…table to set a wholesale price p w such that all the …nal customers purchase given the equilibrium retail prices, i.e. p w + 2 = u 9 16 . In this case, we have no improvement with respect to the case of decentralized markets. Any wholesale price below p w , however, will increase …nal customers surplus by decreasing retail prices. In this sense, introducing a wholesale market makes customers (weakly) better o¤.
Conclusions
We have considered in this paper entry and competition in the liberalized natural gas market. The model rests on three key assumptions, that correspond to essential features of the gas industry: wholesale and retail activities are not separated and are run by the same …rms (retailers, that, due to TOP obligations, are endowed with low marginal cost core capacity, with higher marginal costs for additional supply. The retail market is decentralized and the marketing decision regarding which customers to serve is medium term and sunk once taken. Once chosen the submarkets to serve, …rms compete in prices, with slight di¤erentiation in the commercial service that justi…es the expectation of a fragmented market structure in the downstream market.
Our main …nding is that entry can lead to segmentation and monopoly pricing rather than competition. The key mechanism works as follows: in a decentralized market each …rm has to choose which customers to approach; since both …rms have TOP obligations, if both compete for the same customer(s) the equilibrium price gives very low margins. However, if a …rm exhausts its obligations acting as a monopolist in a segment of the market, it looses any incentive to further enter in the residual part of the market, because it would be unable to obtain positive sales and pro…ts competing with a (low cost) rival still burdened with TOP obligations. Hence, leaving a fraction of the market to the competitor ensures to remain monopolist on the residual demand, maximizing the rents over the low cost capacity. The equilibrium entry pattern requires to select different submarkets and pricing as a monopolist. The outcome is therefore one of entry without competition.
This result persists even when antitrust ceilings or forced divestiture of import contracts are imposed to the incumbent, as in some national liberalization plans in Europe is prescribed: the only e¤ect of these measures it that of shifting market shares and pro…ts to the entrant, without inducing competition in the same submarkets. A more complex reform, instead, can have positive e¤ects on competition. It requires to separate wholesalers, that purchase gas from the producers according to long term contract with TOP clauses, from retailers, that select the submarket to serve and set …nal prices, creating a wholesale market where the former supply and the latter demand gas. In this case the retailers, when designing their marketing strategy, have a ‡at marginal cost equal to the wholesale price and their dominant strategy is to enter each and every submarket. Then, generalized price competition occurs and the retail margins are squeezed compared to the benchmark case. The level of the wholesale price (and competition in the wholesale market) becomes crucial in this perspective. With intense competition the …nal price of gas becomes very low, although we might imagine more complex strategies of the wholesalers, e.g. competition in supply functions, that can implement high (wholesale) prices. In any case, customers are not worse o¤ in a wholesale market setting compared with the benchmark case.
These results suggest that the liberalization plans, focussed so far on the task of creating opportunities of entry and a level playing …eld for new comers, should not take as granted that entry will bring in competition in the market. The issue of promoting competition seems the next step that the liberalization policies need to address. We turn now to all the cases in which the price(s) set by the entrant(s) induce only a fraction of consumers in the …rst market to purchase. If only I enters it retains some of its initial obligations while E still retains all its obligations: q If both enter and E sets a price such that it sells more than its obligations, I remains with residual obligations larger than the second market, i.e. q For intermediate values of
2 ) the pro…ts are kinked, Proof. of Proposition 1 . If both …rms enter in the second market, we have price competition with residuals obligations that fall in one of the three cases analyzed in Lemma 1. The best reply functions in these subgames di¤er for the position of the intermediate segments
In order to identify their relative position we can substitute the second in the …rst:
This expression can be interpreted in the following way: pick a price p i 2 and identify the price of …rm j that makes …rm j's demand equal to its residual obligations: p In case 4) if only …rm i enters market 2, the demand is described above by (4) or (5). The highest price at which every consumer buys one unit of the good is p m = u Proof. of Proposition 2. In Lemma 1 we have identi…ed the relevant subgames in the second market, indexed to the residual obligations q I 2 and q E 2 of the two …rms (cases 1-3), while in Proposition 1 we have characterized the corresponding price equilibria in case one or both …rms enter. If both …rms enter, no …rm in the relevant subgames sells more than its residual obligations and obtains positive pro…ts if it has positive residual obligations. If a …rm already exhausted its obligations and enters, it obtains no sales and pro…ts in the corresponding price equilibrium. Hence, according to the no frivolous entry assumption, it does not enter. If, instead, a …rm has positive residual obligations, entering is a dominant strategy: if the other …rm does not enter the entrant realizes the monopoly pro…ts; if it enters as well, the former …rm obtains positive sales and pro…ts.
Proof. of Proposition 3. Point (a). We consider the incentives to overpricing of the incumbent, that has a larger TOP obligations. From Proposition 1 we know that …rm I's pro…ts in market 1 are maximized at p m = u 9 16 . If …rm I sets a price p
Proposition 2 has shown that in this case both …rms will enter also in the second market. I's overall pro…ts are
. Then the derivative of the pro…t function evaluated at p
that is, the second market pro…t gains do not compensate the reduced pro…ts in the …rst market. The same holds true a fortiori if only …rm E enters in the …rst market. Point (b). Let us de…ne the following subsets of the strategy space P = (p
A …rm E exhausts its obligations in the the …rst market (D C …rm E doesn't sell anything in the …rst market and I exhausts its capacity; therefore in the second market only E will enter. Finally, for (p I 1 ; p E 1 ) 2 P B no …rm exhausts its obligations in the …rst market and therefore both will enter also in the second. Hence, the three sets de…ne di¤erent entry patterns in the second stage. Notice, for future reference, that P A and P C are closed sets while P B is open. From the previous discussion, the incumbent's pro…ts jump up at the boundary of P A while the entrant's pro…ts have a similar pattern at the boundary of P C since in the two cases one of the …rms remains monopolist in the second market. Finally, the industry pro…ts = I + E are discontinuous at the boundaries of P A and P C , since the joint pro…ts when the second market is a duopoly (region P B ) are strictly lower than those obtained when it becomes a monopoly. Once introduced this notation we can prove part (b) distinguishing the three points. Point 1. We prove that no price equilibrium in pure strategies exists if both …rms enter in the …rst market. The incumbent's pro…t function in the …rst market is C , it corresponds to the overall pro…ts I since the incumbent does not enter in the second market; at the boundary of P B with P C (where the two …rms enter in the second market) the residual capacity of the incumbent q I 2 , and the second market pro…ts, tend to zero. Hence, I is continuous moving from P C to P B . At the boundary of P B and P A the entrant exhausts all its obligations in market 1, and I becomes monopolist in market 2, adding (u 9 16 )D 2 to the …rst market pro…ts. Hence, since I produces in the …rst market in all the three regions I has a global maximum at the boundary of P A where the market 2 monopoly pro…ts are added, and the incumbent best reply is p
Turning to the entrant's pro…ts, a similar pattern occurs, with a discrete jump in the pro…t function entering region P C , where E = (u 9 16 )D 2 . The entrant's pro…ts has a global maximum at the boundary of P C and its best reply is p
Hence, there is no price pair that satis…es the two best reply functions simultaneously. Each …rm wants the rival to sell all its obligations in the …rst market, in order to monopolize the second market. This proves point 1.
Point 2. Now we turn to proving the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium in prices, relying on Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) Theorem 5. First notice that …rm i's strategy space P i R + and the discontinuity set for the incumbent is (using Dasgupta and Maskin notation) P (I) = nonly prices so high that I does not sell anything when the entrant is pricing at p E 2 = u 9 16 . But this cannot occur in a mixed strategy equilibrium since the incumbent would be better o¤ by setting with probability one a lower price, selling its residual ceilings and making pro…ts.
Proof. of Proposition 7. First notice that wholesale demand is D(p a ; p b ) D. The wholesalers are not capacity constrained, as they can purchase from the extractors at unit cost w any quantity exceeding their obligations q i . Hence, setting a price above the rival leaves with no sales and no pro…ts, and it is never an optimal reply as long as the rival is pricing above w. Considering the price pairs not higher than w, if …rm i sets the same price as the rival, i.e. p i = p j , i; j = I; E; i 6 = j, its pro…ts are Proof. of Proposition 8. Let us …rst consider the retail market equilibrium prices. The marginal costs of the two …rms is p w = w if total demand for gas D(p a ; p b ) is equal to D and p w < w if total demand for gas is lower than D. If both …rms enter in submarket d, …rm i's pro…ts, i; j = a; b, i 6 = j, are 
